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Abstract. Within social choice theory, the new ﬁeld of judgment aggregation aims
at reaching collective judgments on a set of logically interconnected propositions. I
investigate decision problems, in which the agenda is a network,c o m p o s e do fa t o m i c
propositions and connection rules between them. Networks can represent various
realistic decision problems, including most concrete examples given in the literature.
Nevertheless, networks are unexplored so far due to problems when modelling con-
nection rules in standard propositional logic. By extending the logic, I prove that, for
any network, decision rules satisfying the common conditions always exist, in contrast
to the literature’s emphasis on impossibilities. I also characterise the class of such
decision rules, and propose a simple way to select a decision rule.
Key words: judgment aggregation, collective inconsistency, possibility theorems, net-
work, connection rule, formal logic, material conditional, subjunctive conditional
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D70, D71, D79
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The newly arising model of judgment aggregation takes a diﬀerent approach to collect-
ive decision-making from the classical model of preference aggregation. A collective
decision is not represented as one choice between many alternatives, but as many de-
cisions on single propositions (issues, questions), where the propositions are intercon-
nected. The new model is very general, since propositions can represent beliefs (e.g.
“pollution creates global warming”), desires (e.g. “global warming is undesirable”)
or act preferences (e.g. “measure X against pollution should be taken”). Moreover,
the model is close to real decision situations, for at least two reasons. First, it does
not require individuals to rank many complex alternatives (I am rarely able) but
only to have an opinion on diﬀerent issues; and, second, it accounts for the fact that
real choice situations in committees, management boards, governments, societies etc.
often consist indeed in reaching decisions on several interconnected issues, such as
whether to believe that a rule has been abused, whether to abolish a rule, whether
to hire someone, etc.
In this paper, I analyse an important type of judgment aggregation problem:
deciding simultaneously whether to accept certain atomic propositions and whether
to accept certain links (constraints) between these propositions. For instance, consider
a company board that has to decide on its product management strategy. The board
members disagree on whether the following atomic propositions are true or false.
a : the demand for products sold under an old brand is about to decline;
b : a new brand should be created now;c : more money should be spent on marketing.
Not surprisingly, they also disagree on the connections between a, b and c.S o m e
believe that a → b (“if the demand for products sold under an old brand is about
to decline then a new brand should be created now”). Others believe that c ↔ a
(“more money should be spent on marketing if and only if the demand for products
sold under an old brand is about to decline”). Even others think that a → (b ∧ c)
(“if a then [b and c]”). Each connection rule establishes a constraint on the decisions
on a, b and c:i fa → b is accepted it becomes inconsistent to accept a and reject c;
if c ↔ a is accepted it becomes inconsistent to accept exactly one of a and c;a n di f
a → (b∧c) is accepted it becomes inconsistent to accept a and reject b or c (or both).
Reaching a collective decision is non-trivial. The decisions on a, b, c should neither
ignore some person’s opinion on constraints between a, b, c, nor blindly accept these
constraints. So, the group must decide both on a, b, c and on each connection rule.
However, the natural proposal of taking a majority vote on each (atomic or non-
atomic) proposition often leads to inconsistent outcomes, as illustrated in Table 1.
a b c a → b c ↔ a a → (b ∧ c)
1/3 of the board Yes Yes No Yes No No
1/3 of the board No No No Yes Yes Yes
1/3 of the board Yes No Yes No Yes No
Majority Yes No No Yes Yes No
Table 1: Inconsistencies under majority voting
In Table 1, two connection rules, namely a → b and c ↔ a, receive majority
approval, but the majority decisions on a, b and c violate these two constraints: given
the acceptance of a, the constraint a → b would have required the acceptance of b,
and the constraint c ↔ a would have required the acceptance of c.
By Table 1, propositionwise majority rule may generate logically inconsistent col-
lective judgments for the agenda at hand. Are there any other “acceptable” decision
rules that avoid this ﬂaw? A negative answer would be no surprise, given the various
impossibility theorems cited below. Many of these theorems would indeed apply to
the agenda at hand if we were to model the connection rules (a → b,c ↔ a,a → (b∧c))
as material (bi)conditionals. However, as I will show, this would be a misrepresent-
ation of connection rules. Under an adequate representation of connection rules, the
agenda at hand and more generally all networks do allow for “acceptable” decision
rules with consistent outcomes, a perhaps somewhat surprising ﬁnding.
In Section 2, I introduce the model of judgment aggregation. In Section 3, Id e ﬁne
the logic used to adequately represent connection rules. In Section 4, Ip r o v et h em a i n
possibility result for networks. In Section 5, I come to a full characterisation of the
relevant class of decision rules, by focussing on so-called simple networks. In Section
6, I propose easy methods to construct decision rules. Section 7 contains conclusions.
On an informal basis, judgment aggregation has been discussed already for a
while (e.g. Kornhauser and Sager 1986, Pettit 2001, Brennan 2001, Chapman 2002).
List and Pettit (2002) formalise judgment aggregation using standard propositional
logic, and prove a ﬁrst impossibility result. Stronger impossibility results are derived
by Pauly and van Hees (2004), Dietrich (2004a/b), Gärdenfors (2004), Nehring and
Puppe (2004) and van Hees (2004). To escape impossibilities, one may for instance
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condition to premises (Dietrich 2004a), use fusion operators (Pigozzi 2004), or use
sequential decision rules (List 2004b and Dietrich and List 2005). The models of
Pauly and van Hees (2004) and van Hees (2004) allow for degrees of acceptance. The
probability of “correct” collective judgments is analysed in by Bovens and Rabinowicz
(2004) and List (2004a). Characterisations of the class of aggregation rules satisfying
various collective rationality conditions (and other conditions) are provided in Nehring
and Puppe (2004) and Dietrich and List (2005).
2 Basic notions of the model
Consider a group of persons 1,...,n(n ≥ 2), facing a collective decision problem.
The language. Following the generalised model of judgment aggregation presen-
ted in Dietrich (2004b), propositions need not be stated in standard propositional
logic. Rather, one can use any logic satisfying mild conditions, such as (L1)-(L5) in
Dietrich (2004b).1 This permits several more expressive logics, including the condi-
tional logic used in this paper to deﬁne networks. The language L of our conditional
logic contains atomic propositions without logical connectives and non-atomic pro-
positions with the logical operators ¬ (not), ∧ (and), ∨ (or), → (if-then), ↔ (if and
only if). As deﬁned later, → and ↔ are subjunctive,n o tmaterial (bi)conditionals.
Formally, L is the (smallest) set such that (i) L contains the given atomic propositions
a, b, c, ..., and (ii) whenever L contains two propositions p and q,t h e nL also contains
¬p, (p∧q), (p∨q), (p → q) and (p ↔ q). For convenience, I drop brackets when there
is no ambiguity, e.g. I write c → (a ∧ b ∧ c) for (c → ((a ∧ b) ∧ c)).
The semantics of the logic, especially of → and ↔,i sd e ﬁned in the next section.
The agenda. The agenda is the set of propositions under consideration; it is
a non-empty subset X ⊆ L,w h e r e( i )X contains no doubly-negated propositions
(¬¬p), and (ii) X is a union of proposition-negation pairs {p,¬p}.T h u s
X = {p,¬p : p ∈ X+}, where X+ := {p ∈ X : p is not a negated proposition}.
T h ea g e n d ao ft h ee x a m p l ei nt h ei n t r o d u c t i o ni sg i v e nb yX+ = {a,b,c,a → b,c ↔
a,a → (b ∧ c)}.
Judgment sets. A judgment set (held by a person or the collective) is a subset
A ⊆ X,w h e r ep ∈ A stands for “the person/the collective accepts proposition p”. A
judgment set A can be more or less rational. It is fully rational if it is both complete
(i.e. p ∈ A or ¬p ∈ A for each pair p,¬p ∈ X)a n d(logically) consistent (as deﬁned
in the next section).
1Formally, a logic (with negation operator) consists of (i) a non-empty set L (of “propositions”)
such that if p ∈ L then ¬p ∈ L ( i . e . e a c hp r o p o s i t i o nc a nb en e g a t e d ) ,a n d( i i )a n( “ e n t a i l m e n t ” )
relation |= (⊆ P(L) × L), relating sets A ⊆ L to propositions p ∈ L;“ A ² p”i sr e a d“ A (logically)
entails p”. L deﬁnes the syntax and |= the semantics of the logic. L is the set of all formable
sentences; L might contain the propositions a,b,¬c,c ∧ d,a → c. ² represents the rules according to
which certain sets of propositions entail other propositions; one might have {a,a → b}| = b.A s e t
A ⊆ L is “inconsistent” if there is a p ∈ L such that A ² p and A ² ¬p.
3Aggregation rules. A proﬁle is an n-tuple (A1,...,A n) of (individual) judgment
sets Ai ⊆ X.A(judgment) aggregation rule is a function F that maps each proﬁle
(A1,...,A n) in a given domain to a (collective) judgment set F(A1,...,A n)=A ⊆
X. Often, the domain of F is the universal domain, i.e. the set of all proﬁles of
fully rational judgment sets. F is complete/consistent/fully rational if F generates
a complete/consistent/fully rational collective judgment set for each proﬁle in its
domain. For instance:
• F is (propositionwise) majority rule if F(A1,...,A n)={p ∈ X : more persons
i have p ∈ Ai than p/ ∈ Ai} for all (A1,...,A n) in the domain of F.D e ﬁn e do nt h e
universal domain, this rule is not consistent, as seen in the introduction.
• F is a dictatorial rule if there is a person j (the “dictator”) such that F(A1,...,A n)=
Aj for all (A1,...,A n) in the domain of F.D e ﬁned on the universal domain, this rule
is fully rational, but of course far from democratic.
3 A logic that can express connection rules
Requirements on the representation of connection rules. It is crucial to use
a logic that ascribes the intended meaning to connection rules such as a → b,c ↔
a,a → (b ∧ c).S p e c i ﬁcally, the logic should satisfy the following two conditions.
(a) The acceptance of a connection rule p establishes exactly the intended logical
constraints on judgments on atomic propositions, i.e. p is consistent with exactly
the “right” sets atomic propositions and negated atomic propositions. For instance,
a → b is inconsistent with {a,¬b} but consistent with each of {a,b}, {¬a,b}, {¬a,¬b}.
(b) The rejection of a connection rule p does not constrain the judgments on
atomic propositions, i.e. ¬p is consistent with each (consistent) set of atomic pro-
positions and negated atomic propositions. For instance, ¬(a → b) is consistent with
each of {a,b}, {a,¬b}, {¬a,b}, {¬a,¬b}.
To illustrate (b), consider again our starting example, in which a is “the demand
for products sold under an old brand is about to decline”, and b is “a new brand
should be created now”. Consider an agent who believes that ¬(a → b),i . e .t h a ta
forthcoming decline in demand does not imply the need for a new brand. This belief
is intuitively perfectly consistent with any opinions on a and b: the agent might or
might not believe that demand will decline, and might or might not believe that a
new brand is needed. The logic should respect this intuition.
The failure of the material conditional. Material (bi)conditionals (used in
standard propositional logic) satisfy (a) but not (b). Consider a → b. Interpreted
as a material conditional, a → b is equivalent to ¬a ∨ b (a is false or b is true), and
¬(a → b) is equivalent to a ∧ ¬b (a is true and b is false). So, under a material
interpretation,
• (a) holds, because a → b is inconsistent with {a,¬b} (as desired) and consistent
with each of {a,b},{¬a,b},{¬a,¬b} (as desired);
• (b) is violated, because ¬(a → b), far from imposing no constraints, is incon-
sistent with all sets containing ¬a or containing b.
It is well-known that material conditionals misrepresent the intended meaning of
most conditional statements in common language. The (in common language clearly
false) conditional “if the earth falls on the sun then we freeze” is true under a material
4interpretation because the earth does not fall on the sun. This clash between our
intuition and the material conditional is due to the fact that, in common language,
“if a then b” is not a statement about whether a and b a r et r u ei nt h eactual world,
but about whether b is true in world(s) in which a is true, for instance in worlds in
which the earth falls on the sun; in other words, “if a then b”m e a n s“ i fa were true
ceteris paribus, then b would be true”, not “a is false or b is true”.
A conditional logic. By the last remarks, the truth value of a → b is not simply
a function of the actual truth values of a and b, but of their truth values in possible
worlds. This leads to the notion of a subjunctive conditional,w h i c hw a sf o r m a l i s e db y
D. Lewis (1973) using a conditional logic and is now well-established in non-classical
logic. I will use a standard version of conditional logic, often denoted C+ (other
related versions could also be used). For further reference, e.g. Priest (2001).
The language L was already deﬁned in Section 2. I now endow L with semantics.
For comparison, recall that in standard propositional logic (not in our logic!) an
interpretation is given by a (“truth”) function v : L → {T,F},a s s i g n i n gt oe a c h
proposition a truth value, such that, for any propositions p,q ∈ L,
(¬) v(¬p)=T i fa n do n l yi fv(p)=F,
(∧) v(p ∧ q)=T i fa n do n l yi fv(p)=T and v(q)=T,
(∨) v(p ∨ q)=T i fa n do n l yi fv(p)=T or v(q)=T,
(→material) v(p → q)=T if and only if v(p)=F or v(q)=T,
(↔) v(p ↔ q)=T i fa n do n l yi fv(p → q)=T and v(q → p)=T.
By contrast, I deﬁne an interpretation as a triple (W, (Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W), where:
• W is a non-empty set, whose members are called (possible) worlds;
• (Rp)p∈L is a family of binary relation on W (wRpw0 is interpreted as “world
w0 is similar to world w,a n dp is true in w0”), such that, for any w,w0 ∈ W and
p ∈ L,( i )i fwRpw0 then vw0(p)=T (an obvious requirement given the interpretation
of wRpw0) and (ii) if vw(p)=T then wRpw (since w is similar to itself);
• (vw)w∈W is a family of (“truth”) functions vw : L → {T,F},a s s i g n i n gt oe a c h
proposition p ∈ L its truth value vw(p) in world w ∈ W, such that, for each world
w ∈ W and any propositions p,q ∈ L, the truth function v = vw satisﬁes (¬), (∧),
(∨), (↔)a n d
(→) vw(p → q)=T if and only if vw0(q)=T for each world w0 ∈ W with wRpw0.
By (→), p → q is true in world w just in case q is true in every world w0 similar
to w and with true p. This captures the intuition of conditional statements. For
instance, “if the earth falls on the sun then we freeze” is plausibly false, because we
do not freeze in those worlds similar to the actual world except that the earth falls
on the sun. The requirements (a) and (b) on the representation of connection rules
are now both satisﬁed.2
By deﬁnition, a set of propositions A ⊆ L is (logically) consistent if some world
of some interpretation makes each p ∈ A true, i.e. if there exists an interpretation
(W,(Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W) and a world w ∈ W such that vw(p)=T for all p ∈ A.
Finally, a set A ⊆ L (logically) entails ap r o p o s i t i o np ∈ L (“A ² p”) if, for every
interpretation (W,(Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W) and every world w ∈ W such that vw(q)=T
2Regarding (b) (where the material conditional fails), this follows from Lemma 1 applied to sets
A containing no (non-negated) connection rules (note that (1) and (2) are then vacuously true).
5for all q ∈ A,w eh a v evw(p)=T.I n t u i t i v e l y ,A is consistent in case all members of A
can be simultaneously true, and A entails p if whenever each q ∈ A is true p is true.
4 A general possibility theorem
After having deﬁned our logic, including our subjunctive interpretation of → and ↔,
I come to the possibility theorem for networks.
Deﬁnition 1 (a) A connection rule is a (subjunctive) conditional p → q or bicondi-
tional p ↔ q,w h e r ep and q are atomic propositions or conjunctions of many atomic
propositions.
(b) The agenda X is a network if each p ∈ X+ is either an atomic proposition or
a connection rule.
In a network, atomic propositions represent particular issues, and connection rules
represent potential links between these issues. If a connection rule is accepted, it
establishes a constraint on how to decide issues; if it is rejected, there is no constraint.
b
a




(2) X + = {a, b,
a ↔ b}
(3) X + = {a, b, c,
c ↔ (a ∧ b)}
c
b a
(4) X + = {a, b, c, a → b








(5) X + = {a, c, a → b,
b → c}
(6) X + = {a, b, a → b,
b → c, c → d, d → a}
b c
a
(7) X + = {a, b, c, a → b, b → a,
b → c, c → b, c → a, a → c}
Figure 1: Examples of networks
Figure 1 shows seven networks, where the network (4) represents the marketing
strategy example of the introduction. In general, each network X can be represented
by a graph as follows.
• Nodes contain atomic propositions, where an atomic proposition is put in brack-
ets if it is not contained in X but only occurs in a connection rule contained in X;
• Each arrow represents a connection rule p → q or p ↔ q in X, where the arrow is
bidirectional in the case of a biconditional, and where the arrow contains bifurcations
in the case that p and/or q is a conjunction of more than one atomic proposition.
6Let me give some concrete examples illustrating the broad applications of net-
works.
• The agenda is either of the networks (3), (4), (5), (7), where a, b, c are as in the
introductory example of a company board deciding its marketing strategy. In each of
these networks, a diﬀerent set of connection rules (constraints) is under consideration.
• An expert commission has to reach collective judgments on environmental issues.
Their agenda is the network (1), where
a : carbon dioxide emissions cause global warming;
b : taxes on kerosene should be introduced.
• T h eg o v e r n m e n to fas t a t eh a st od e c i d eo nits anti-terrorism policy. The agenda
is the network (2), where (as in Dietrich and List 2005)
a : country X has weapons of mass destruction;
b : action Y should be taken against country X.
• As in the notorious doctrinal paradox (e.g. Kornhauser and Sager 1986), a court
has to decide a trial against a company. The agenda is the network (3), where
a : the company has broken the contract (with another company);
b : the contract was legally valid;
c : the company is liable (to pay damages to the other company).
If the agenda X is a network, does there exist any “acceptable” procedure to
reach collective judgments? A procedure is standardly considered as “acceptable” if
it generates rational collective judgments and is suitably democratic. The rationality
requirement means (for networks) essentially that the judgments on atomic propos-
itions should respect all accepted connection rules. The democraticity requirement
can be interpreted to mean that the aggregation rule should satisfy independence,
anonymity, responsiveness, monotonicity,a n duniversal domain;f o rd e ﬁnitions of
these standard conditions, see for instance Dietrich and List (2005) (the conditions
also imply strategy-proofness; see Dietrich and List 2004). This is a demanding inter-
pretation, illustrating the strength of the below possibility result. The most notable
condition is independence, which requires propositionwise aggregation: the collective
judgment on each proposition should be determined solely by the individual judg-
ments on this proposition, regardless of any individual judgments on other proposi-
tions — an analogue of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives for preference
aggregation.
As is easily shown, for any agenda X, the class of aggregation rules satisfying
the above democraticity conditions is the class of quota rules,d e ﬁned in Dietrich
and List (2005) and closely related to Nehring and Puppe’s (2004) voting by quota.
Under a quota rule, each proposition p ∈ X is accepted if and only if the number
of persons accepting it exceeds some (proposition-speciﬁc) threshold. Speciﬁcally,
consider any family of thresholds (mp)p∈X,w h e r emp ∈ {1,...,n} is the threshold for
proposition p ∈ X. To each such family corresponds a quota rule, F(mp)p∈X,d e ﬁned
as the aggregation rule with universal domain given by
F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n): ={p ∈ X : at least mp persons i have p ∈ Ai}.
A natural requirement is that m¬p = n +1− mp for any pair p,¬p ∈ X,w h i c h
ensures that exactly one member of each pair p,¬p ∈ X is accepted under each
7proﬁle3 (implying completeness). A quota rule with this property can be written as
F(mp)p∈X+, since the threshold for any ¬p ∈ X follows from that for p ∈ X+.M o r e
precisely, to each family (mp)p∈X+ of numbers in {1,...,n} corresponds a quota rule,
F(mp)p∈X+,d e ﬁned as
F(mp)p∈X+ := F(mp)p∈X,w h e r em¬p := n +1− mp for each ¬p ∈ X.
Aq u o t ar u l eF(mp)p∈X+ is an attractive solution to the aggregation problem
provided that it is consistent, i.e. generate consistent judgment sets. But does there
exist any consistent quota rules F(mp)p∈X+?
Theorem 1 If the agenda is a network, there exists a consistent quota rule F(mp)p∈X+.
Corollary 1 If the agenda is a network, there exists a fully rational (i.e. consistent
and complete), independent, anonymous, monotonic and responsive aggregation rule
with universal domain.
This possibility result may appear surprising. Previous results suggest, in short,
that agendas with suﬃciently interconnected propositions lead to impossibilities. By
contrast, the above result holds for all networks, however highly interconnected they
might be. The possibility relies crucially on the use of subjunctive conditionals. In-
deed, for most networks — for instance the networks (2)-(7) in Figure 1 — the possibility
would disappear if the connection rules were replaced by material (bi)conditionals.
So, some impossibilities in the literature (such as Proposition 1 in Dietrich and List
2004) are artefacts of the use of material (bi)conditionals.
To prove Theorem 1, I start with a lemma. Two rationality conditions on judg-
ment sets A ⊆ X are:
for any connection rule p ∈ A,w eh a v e¬p/ ∈ A;( 1 )
for any set of connection rules S ⊆ A and
any connection rule p ∈ X,i fS |= p then p ∈ A.
(2)
Lemma 1 Let X be a network. Any set A ⊆ X satisfying (1) and (2) is consistent
if and only if its subset {p ∈ A : p is not a negated connection rule} is consistent.
Proof. Suppose X is a network and A ⊆ X satisﬁes (1) and (2). Put A0 := {p ∈ A
: p is not a negated connection rule}. Obviously, if A is consistent then so is A0.N o w
assume A0 is consistent.
Claim 1: For any ¬(p → q) ∈ A, there exists a conjunct of q, denoted ap→q,w h i c h
is not a conjunct of p nor of any q0 such that p → q0 ∈ A or p ↔ q0 ∈ A or q0 ↔ p ∈ A.
Assume for contradiction that the claim is false for ¬(p → q) ∈ A.I s h o w t h a t
p → q ∈ A, which contradicts (1). Let S be the set of all propositions in A of the
form p → q0 or p ↔ q0 or q0 ↔ p.B y ( 2 ) , i t i s s u ﬃcient to show that S |= p → q.
So, consider any world w of any interpretation (W, (Rr)r∈L,(vw)w∈W) such that each
member of S is true in w. To show that p → q is true in w,c o n s i d e ra n yw o r l d
w∗ ∈ W such that wRpw∗.Ih a v et os h o wt h a tq is true in w∗, i.e. that each conjunct
3This follows because the number of persons accepting p is n minus the number accepting ¬p.
8of q is true in w∗.L e ta be any conjunct of q.I fa is a conjunct of p, a is true in w∗
since p is true in w∗.N o wl e ta not be a conjunct of p. Then, by assumption, there
exists an r ∈ S,w h e r er is either p → q0 or p ↔ q0 or q0 ↔ p, such that a is a conjunct
of q0.A sr is true in w and wRpw∗, q0 is true in w∗. Hence a is true in w∗, q.e.d.
Claim 2:F o ra n y¬(p ↔ q) ∈ A,
(α) either there exists a conjunct of q, denoted aˆ p↔q, which is not a conjunct of
p nor of any q0 such that p → q0 ∈ A or p ↔ q0 ∈ A or q0 ↔ p ∈ A,
(β) or there exists a conjunct of p, denoted ap↔ˆ q, which is not a conjunct of q nor
of any p0 such that q → p0 ∈ A or q ↔ p0 ∈ A or p0 ↔ q ∈ A.
Assume for contradiction that neither (α)n o r( β)h o l d sf o r¬(p ↔ q) ∈ A.Is h o w
that p ↔ q ∈ A, which contradicts (1). Let Sp be the set of all propositions in A of
the form p → q0 or p ↔ q0 or q0 ↔ p,a n dSq the set of all propositions in A of the
form q → p0 or q ↔ p0 or p0 ↔ q.B y( 2 ) ,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that Sp∪Sq |= p ↔ q.
So it is suﬃcient to show that Sp |= p → q and that Sq |= q → p. These entailments
can be shown by the same procedure as in the proof of claim 1, q.e.d.
Iw r i t e“ p ⊃ q”f o r“ ¬p ∨ q”, and “p ⊃⊂ q”f o r“ (p ⊃ q) ∧ (q ⊃ p)”; so, p ⊃
q and p ⊃⊂ q are equivalent to material (bi)conditionals. Let A0 be the set of
propositions arising from A0 by replacing each connection rule r ∈ A0 by its material
counterpart r, obtained from r by replacing “→”b y“ ⊃”, or “↔”b y“ ⊃⊂”. Since
A0 is consistent and r |= r f o re a c hc o n n e c t i o nr u l er, A0 is also consistent. Now
consider an interpretation (W,(Rp)p∈X,(vw)w∈W) and a world w ∈ W subject to the
following conditions:
(w1) In w, the truth values of atomic propositions are such that each member of
A0 is true (which is possible since A0 is consistent).
(w2) For any ¬(p → q) ∈ A there is a world, denoted wp→q ∈ W\{w},i nw h i c h
all atomic proposition except ap→q are true; moreover, we have wRpwp→q, but not
wRswp↔q for any s ∈ L\{p}.
(w3) For any ¬(p ↔ q) ∈ A such that (α) holds, there is a world, denoted
wˆ p↔q ∈ W\{w}, in which all atomic propositions except aˆ p↔q are true; moreover, we
have wRpwˆ p↔q, but not wRswˆ p↔q for any s ∈ L\{p}.
(w4) For any ¬(p ↔ q) ∈ A such that (β) holds, there is a world, denoted
wp↔ˆ q ∈ W\{w}, in which all atomic propositions except ap↔ˆ q are true; moreover, we
have wRqwp↔ˆ q, but not wRswp↔ˆ q for any s ∈ L\{q}.
(w5) Each world w0 ∈ W that is neither w nor any of the worlds deﬁned in
(w2)-(w4) is not reachable from w, i.e. there is no r ∈ L with wRrw0.
To complete the proof, consider any r ∈ A.Is h o wt h a tr is true in w.
Case 1: r is a possibly negated atomic proposition. Then r ∈ A0.T h u sr is true
in w by (w1).
Case 2: r is a conditional s → t.L e tw0 ∈ W be any world with wRsw0.Ih a v et o
show that t is true in w0.I fw0 = w,t h e ns is true in w by wRsw.A ss ⊃ t = r ∈ A0,
s ⊃ t is true in w by (w1). Since s and s ⊃ t a r et r u ei nw, so is t. Now suppose
w0 6= w.T h e nb y( w 5 ) ,w0 is one of the worlds deﬁn e di n( w 2 ) - ( w 4 ) .A s s u m ew0 is a
world deﬁned in (w2) (the proofs for (w3) and (w4) are analogous). In other words,
w0 = wp→q for some p,q ∈ L.B y wRswp→q and (w2), p = s. By (w2), all atomic
propositions except ap→q are true in wp→q.B y p → t = s → t ∈ A and claims 1,
ap→q is not a conjunct of t.S ot is true in wp→q = w0.
9Case 3: r is a biconditional s ↔ t. s ↔ t is true in w in case s → t and t → s are
true in w. Both of these claims can be shown by a procedure analogous to that for
case 2.
Case 4: r is a negated conditional ¬(p → q). To show that r is true in w,Is h o w
that p → q is false in w. This is so because the world wp→q satisﬁes wRpwp→q by
(w2), and q is false in wp→q as q contains the conjunct ap→q which is false in wp→q.
Case 5: r is a negated biconditional ¬(p ↔ q). To show that r is true in w,I
show that p ↔ q is false in w,i . e . t h a tp → q or q → p is false in w.B y c l a i m 2 ,
there are two cases (α)a n d( β). In case (α), p → q is false in w because the world
wˆ p↔q satisﬁes wRpwˆ p↔q by (w3), and q is false in wˆ p↔q as q contains the conjunct
aˆ p↔q which is false in wˆ p↔q.I nc a s e( β), q → p is false in w because the world wp↔ˆ q
satisﬁes wRqwp↔ˆ q by (w4), and p is false in wp↔ˆ q as p contains the conjunct ap↔ˆ q
which is false in wp↔ˆ q. ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1.L e tX b ean e t w o r k .I np a r tA ,Ip r o v et h ec l a i mi nas p e c i a l
case; the general case is proven in part B. Let B be the set of all atomic propositions
in X, and C the set of all connection rules in X.
A. In this part, I assume that X contains each atomic proposition a that occurs in
some connection rule in X. I show that the quota rule F := F(mp)p∈X+ with mp = n
for all p ∈ X+ is consistent. Consider any proﬁle (A1,...,A n) in the universal domain,
and let me show that A := F(A1,...,A n) is consistent. A satisﬁes the assumptions (1)
and (2) of Lemma 1. This follows easily from the deﬁnition of F and the fact that each
Ai satisﬁes (1) and (2). So, by Lemma 1, it is suﬃcient to show that A0 := {p ∈ A :
p is not a negated connection rule} is consistent. To do so, I deﬁne an interpretation
a n daw o r l di nw h i c he a c hm e m b e ro fA0 is true (which is much easier than for A).
Let (W, (Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W) be an interpretation and w ∈ W a world such that
(1) for any atomic proposition a, vw(a)=T i fa n do n l yi fa ∈ A0.
(2) for any world w ∈ W\{w},v w(a)=T for every atomic proposition a.
Now let p ∈ A0. To show that vw(p)=T, we distinguish for cases (note that the
case in which p is a negated connection rule does not exist).
Case 1: p is an atomic proposition a.S ovw(a)=T by (1), q.e.d.
Case 2: p is a negated atomic proposition ¬a.B y ¬a ∈ A0 and the deﬁnition
of F, there is a person who accepts ¬a. This person does not accept a.S oa/ ∈ A0,
again by the deﬁnition of F. Hence vw(a)=F by (1). So ww(¬a)=T,q . e . d .
Case 3: p is a conditional p → q. To show that vw(p → q)=T,c o n s i d e ra n y
world w ∈ W such that wRpw, and let us show that vw(q)=T.I f w 6= w,t h e n
vw(q)=T by (2). Now suppose w = w.T h e n wRpw.H e n c e p is true in w.S o
every conjunct of p is true in w. Hence, by (1), every conjunct of p belongs to A0.
Since p → q and each conjunct of p are contained in A0,t h e ya r ec o n t a i n e di ne a c ho f
A1,...,A n by the deﬁnition of F. Since they together entail each conjunct of q,e a c h
conjunct of q i sc o n t a i n e di ne a c ho fA1,...,A n. So each conjunct of q belongs to A0,
again by the deﬁnition of F. So, by (1), each conjunct of q is true in w. Hence q is
true in w,q . e . d .
Case 4: p is a biconditional p ↔ q.T h e np is true in w just in case p → q and
q → p a r et r u ei nw. The truth of p → q and of q → p in w can be shown by the
method used in case 3, q.e.d.
10B. I now drop the previous assumption that each atomic proposition occurring
in a connection rule in X is contained in X. I will reduce this general case to the
previous special case. Consider the extended agenda X := X∪{a,¬a : a is an atomic
proposition occurring in some proposition in X}. By part A, there exists a consistent
quota rule F(mp)
p∈X+ for the agenda X. Now consider the quota rule F(mp)p∈X+ for
the agenda X. As one easily checks, for each (A1,...,A n) in the domain of F(mp)p∈X+,
F(mp)p∈X+(A1,...,A n)=F(mp)
p∈X+(A1,...,An) ∩ X,
where, for each person i, Ai is any complete and consistent judgment set for the agenda
X such that Ai ⊆ Ai. So the consistency of F(mp)
p∈X+ implies that of F(mp)p∈X+. ¥
5 A characterisation theorem
The above possibility result leaves open the question how large the possibility space
is. For a given network X, what type of thresholds mp,p∈ X+, is allowed if one
wants the quota rule F(mp)p∈X+ to be consistent? For so-called simple networks, a
compact answer to this question can be given.
Deﬁnition 2 An e t w o r kX is simple if (i) each connection rule in X is a conditional
a → b, in which a and b are distinct atomic propositions, and (ii) for each a → b ∈ X,
we have a ∈ X and b ∈ X.
For instance, the networks (1) and (7) in Figure 1 are simple. In graphic terms,
a network is simple if and only if its graph contsins (i) no arrow that is bidirectional
or bifurcating or pointing from a proposition to itself, and (ii) no atomic proposition
in brackets.
Theorem 2 If X is a simple network, a quota rule F(mp)p∈X+ is consistent if and
only if
mb ≤ ma + ma→b − n for each connection rule a → b ∈ X.
This characterises consistency in terms of a system of simple linear inequalities.
The more connection rules X contains, the more inequalities have to be satisﬁed
to achieve consistency. For the network X with X+ = {a,b,a → b},aq u o t ar u l e
F(mp)p∈X+ is consistent just in case mb ≤ ma + ma→b − n holds, hence for instance
if n =1 0 , ma = ma→b =8and mb =6 . For the network X with X+ = {a,b,c,a →
b,b → c}, aq u o t ar u l eF(mp)p∈X+ is consistent just in case mb ≤ ma + ma→b − n
and mc ≤ mb + mb→c − n, hence for instance in case n =1 0 , ma = ma→b =8 ,
mb = mb→c =6and mc =2 .
Before coming to the proof, let me note some corollaries. If each p ∈ X+ has the
same (“uniform”) threshold m = mp then all inequalities in Theorem 2 reduce to the
same inequality m ≤ m + m − n, hence to m ≥ n,i . e .m = n.S o :
Corollary 2 If X is a simple network (containing at least one connection rule), there
exists exactly one consistent quota rule F(m)p∈X+ with a uniform threshold m for all
p ∈ X+; it is given by the unanimity threshold m = n.
11Theorem 2 also yields two general properties of consistent quota rules. First, since
t h ei n e q u a l i t yi nT h e o r e m2 implies that mb ≤ ma, the acceptance threshold must
decrease (weakly) along each path in X.F o r m a l l y :
Deﬁnition 3 Let X be a simple network.
(i) a ∈ X is a parent of b ∈ X (and b a child of a)i fa → b ∈ X;
(ii) A path (in X) is a sequence (a1,...,a k) (k ≥ 2) of atomic propositions such
that a1 → a2 ∈ X, a2 → a3 ∈ X, ..., ak−1 → ak ∈ X;
(iii) a ∈ X is an ancestor of b ∈ X (and b a descendant of a)i ft h e r ee x i s t sa
path (a1,...,a k) with a1 = a and ak = b.
Corollary 3 If X is a simple network, any consistent quota rule F(mp)p∈X+ satisﬁes
mb ≤ ma for each a,b ∈ X such that b is a descendant of a.
Second, if the networks contains cycles the inequalities of Theorem 2 impose a
rather severe restriction on the choice of thresholds:
Deﬁnition 4 A cycle in a simple network X is a path (a1,...,a k) in X with a1 = ak.
Corollary 4 If X is a simple network, any consistent quota rule F(mp)p∈X+ satisﬁes
ma1 = ... = mak and ma1→a2 = ... = mak−1→ak = n for each cycle (a1,...,a k).
Proof.L e t X be a simple network and F(mp)p∈X+ consistent. Any two distinct
members aj and al of a cycle (a1,...,a k) are descendants of each other. So, by Corol-
lary 3, maj ≤ mal and mal ≤ maj,h e n c emaj = mal. Moreover, for any 1 ≤ j<k ,
by Theorem 2 maj+1 ≤ maj + maj→aj+1 − n.H e n c e , b y maj+1 = maj,w eh a v e
0 ≤ maj→aj+1 − n, so maj→aj+1 = n. ¥
For instance, suppose F(mp)p∈X+ is a consistent quota rule for the simple network
(7) in Figure 1. Since (a,b,c,a) is a cycle, ma = mb = mc and ma→b = mb→c =
mc→a = n.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e(c,b,a,c) is another cycle, mc→b = mb→a = ma→c = n.
So, in summary, one must assign the same threshold to all atomic propositions in X,
and the unanimity threshold n to all connection rules in X — a strong restriction.
Now let me prove Theorem 2. The proof uses the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let X be a simple network. Any set A ⊆ X satisfying (1) is consistent if
and only if its subset {p ∈ A : p is not a negated connection rule} is consistent.
Proof. Suppose X is a simple network and A ⊆ X satisﬁes (1). By Lemma 1,i t
is suﬃcient to show that (2) holds. So, consider any set of connection rules S ⊆ A
and any connection rule a → b ∈ X such that S |= a → b.T o s h o w a → b ∈ A,I
prove a → b ∈ S. For contradiction, suppose a → b/ ∈ S.Is h o wt h a tS ∪ {¬(a → b)}
is consistent, violating S |= a → b.Id e ﬁne an interpretation (W, (Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W)
containing a world in which each p ∈ S ∪ {¬(a → b)} is true. Let W be a binary set
W = {w,w0}, where
(i) In world w, each atomic proposition is true.
(ii) In world w0, b is false and all other atomic propositions are true.
12(iii) From world w, Ra reaches both worlds w and w0.
(iv) From world w,e a c hRa0, where a0 is any atomic proposition diﬀerent from a,
reaches only world w.
I show that each p ∈ S ∪ {¬(a → b)} is true in world w.L e tp ∈ S ∪ {¬(a → b)}.
Case 1: p = ¬(a → b).T h e np is true in w because, by (iii), from wR a reaches
the world w0,i nw h i c hb is false by (ii).
Case 2: p = a0 → b0 with a0 6= a.T h e np is true in w because, by (iv), from w
Ra0 reaches only world w,i nw h i c hb0 is true by (i).
Case 3: p = a → b0.T h e nb0 6= b since a → b/ ∈ S.S ob0 is true in both worlds w
and w0, by (i) and (ii). Hence a → b0 is true in w. ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2.L e tX be a simple network. A set of propositions Y ⊆ X is
minimal inconsistent if it is inconsistent and every proper subset of Y is consistent;
Y ⊆ X is a non-trivial minimal inconsistent set if Y is minimal inconsistent and not
of the form {p,¬p}. For any set Z ⊆ X,apath in Z is a ﬁnite sequence (a1,...,a k)
(k ≥ 2) such that a1 → a2 ∈ Z,a2 → a3 ∈ Z,...,ak−1 → ak ∈ Z;i ti sc a l l e dacyclic if
a1,...,a k are pairwise distinct. I will show that the non-trivial minimal inconsistent
subsets of X are precisely the sets of the form
(*) Y = {a1,a 1 → a2,a 2 → a3,...,a k−1 → ak,¬ak},w h e r e(a1,...,a k) is an acyclic
path in X.
A. In this part, I show that if Y takes the form (*) then Y is a non-trivial minimal
inconsistent subset of X. Suppose Y has the form (*). To see that Y is inconsistent,
suppose for contradiction that there is an interpretation (W,(Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W) and
aw o r l dw ∈ W in which each p ∈ Y is true. Since a1 and a1 → a2 are true in w,s oi s
a2.S i n c ea2 and a2 → a3 a r et r u ei nw, so is a3. Repeating this argument, it follows
that ak is true in w.B u t¬ak is also true in w, a contradiction.
To see that Y is minimal inconsistent, I prove that any subset Z ⊆ Y with |Z| =
|Y |−1 is consistent. This is easily done by deﬁning an interpretation (W,(Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W)
such that some world in W —i nf a c tevery world in W — makes each p ∈ Z true:
• if Z = Y \{¬ak},l e t(W, (Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W) be any interpretation such that
a1,...,a k are true in every world w ∈ W;
• if Z = Y \{a1},l e t(W,(Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W) be any interpretation such that
a1,...,a k are false in every world w ∈ W;
• if Z = Y \{aj → aj+1} for some 1 ≤ j<k ,l e t(W,(Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W) be any
interpretation such that a1,...,a j a r et r u ea n daj+1,...,a k false in every world w ∈ W.
Finally, Y is a non-trivial minimal inconsistent set since k ≥ 2, q.e.d.
B. I now show the converse of part A: if Y is a non-trivial minimal inconsistent
subset of X then Y takes the form (*). Let Y be a non-trivial minimal inconsistent
subset of X.I m a y w r i t e Y = B+ ∪ B− ∪ C+ ∪ C−, where B+,B−,C+,C− are,
respectively, sets of atomic propositions, negated atomic propositions, connection
rules, negated connection rules.
Claim 1: C− = ∅,i . e .Y = B+ ∪ B− ∪ C+.
Since Y is a non-trivial minimal inconsistent set, Y satisﬁes the condition (1) of
Lemma 2.S o ,b yL e m m a2, Y is inconsistent if and only if its subset B+ ∪B− ∪C+
is inconsistent. Since Y is inconsistent, so is B+ ∪ B− ∪ C+. However, since Y is
minimal inconsistent, no proper subset of Y is inconsistent. So B+ ∪B− ∪C+ is not
a proper subset of Y .H e n c eC− = ∅,q . e . d .
13Claim 2: C+ 6= ∅.
For contradiction let C+ = ∅.S oY = B+ ∪ B− by claim 1. For any a ∈ B+ and
¬b ∈ B− we have a 6= b. For otherwise {a,¬b} = {a,¬a}, which is inconsistent, im-
plying that Y = {a,¬a}; this contradicts that Y is a non-trivial minimal inconsistent
set. So Y is consistent, contradicting that Y is minimal inconsistent, q.e.d.
A sequence (a1,...,a k) is a subsequence of another sequence (b1,...,b l) if (a1,...,ak)=
(bj1,...,b jm) for some indices 1 ≤ j1 <j 2 <. . .<j m ≤ l.A p a t h i n Y is called a
maximal path in Y if it is not a subsequence (“subpath”) of another path in Y .
Claim 3: There exists a maximal path in Y , denoted (a1,...,a k). (I will later
show that Y = {a1,a 1 → a2,...,a k−1 → ak,¬ak})
Assume for contradiction the claim is false. I show that Y is consistent, a con-
tradiction. Let (W,(Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W) be an interpretation and w ∈ W aw o r l ds u c h
that:
(i) any atomic proposition a is true in w if and only if a ∈ Y or there exists a
path in Y , (b1,...,b m),w i t hb1 ∈ Y and bm = a;
(ii) from the world w, for each atomic proposition a, Ra does not access any world
w ∈ W\{w}.
Consider any p ∈ Y , and let me show that p is true in w.
Case 1: p = a ∈ B+.T h e nb y( i )a is true in w.
Case 2: p = ¬a ∈ B−. Assume for contradiction that ¬a is false in w,i . e .t h a t
a is true in w. Then, by (i), either a ∈ Y or there exists a path in Y , (b1,...,b m),
such that b1 ∈ Y and bm = a. First assume a ∈ Y .A s Y contains a and ¬a and
is minimal inconsistent, we have Y = {a,¬a}, contradicting that Y is a non-trivial
minimal inconsistent set. Now assume there exists a path in Y , (b1,...,b m), such that
b1 ∈ Y and bm = a.T h es e tY ∗ := {b1,b 1 → b2,...,b m−1 → bm,¬bm} is inconsistent,
by an argument analogous to one made in part A. So Y = Y ∗,s i n c eY ∗ ⊆ Y and Y
is minimal inconsistent. But then (b1,...,b m) is a maximal path in Y , contradicting
the starting assumption.
Case 3: p = a → b ∈ C+.B y( i i ) ,f r o mwR a reaches no world except perhaps
w.I fa is false in w,t h e nf r o mwR a does not reach w, hence reaches no world, so
that a → b is true in w. Now assume a is true in w, and let me show that b is true in
w.B y( i ) ,e i t h e ra ∈ Y or there is a path in Y , (b1,...,b m),w i t hb1 ∈ Y and bm = a.
In the ﬁrst case, (a,b) is a path in Y ; in the second case, (b1,...,b m,b) is a path in Y
since bm → b = a → b ∈ Y . So, by (i), b is true in w,q . e . d .
Claim 4: a1 ∈ Y .
Assume for contradiction that a1 / ∈ Y .S i n c e Y is minimal inconsistent and by
claim 3 contains a1 → a2, Y \{a1 → a2} is consistent. So there is an interpretation
(W,(Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W) and a world w ∈ W such that
vw(p)=T for all p ∈ Y \{a1 → a2}.( 3 )
Now let (W, (R∗
p)p∈L,(v∗
w)w∈W) be a new interpretation with the same set of worlds
W, satisfying the following conditions.
(1*) In each world w ∈ W\{w}, any atomic proposition has the same truth value
as before.
(2*) In the world w, a1 is false and all other atomic propositions have the same
truth value as before.
(3*) From the world w, R∗
a1 accesses no world.
14(4*) R∗
a = Ra for each atomic proposition a 6= a1.
I show that each p ∈ Y is true in the world w of the new interpretation (W,(R∗
p)p∈L,(v∗
w)w∈W).
Then Y is consistent, a contradiction. There are four cases.




Case 2: p = ¬a ∈ B−.I f a = a1 then v∗
w(¬a)=T by (2*). If a 6= a1 then
v∗
w(¬a)=vw(¬a) by (2*), hence v∗
w(¬a)=T by (3).
Case 3: p = a1 → b ∈ C+. By (3*), R∗
a1 accesses no world from w. So, vacuously,
b is true in every world w ∈ W with wR∗
a1w.H e n c ea1 → b is true in w.
Case 4: p = a → b ∈ C+ with a 6= a1.A sb yc l a i m3(a1,...,a k) is a maximal path
in Y , b 6= a1.F r o mwR ∗
a accesses exactly the same worlds w as Ra by (4*), where
v∗
w(b)=vw(b) by (1*) and (2*). So v∗
w(a → b)=vw(a → b), and hence v∗
w(a → b)=T
by (3),q . e . d .
Claim 5: ¬ak ∈ Y .
Assume for contradiction that ¬ak / ∈ Y .S i n c eY is minimal inconsistent and by
claim 3 contains ak−1 → ak, Y \{ak−1 → ak} is consistent. So there is an interpreta-
tion (W, (Rp)p∈L,(vw)w∈W) and a world w ∈ W such that
vw(p)=T for all p ∈ Y \{ak−1 → ak}.( 4 )
Now let (W, (R∗
p)p∈L,(v∗
w)w∈W) be an interpretation with the same set of possible
worlds W, satisfying the following conditions.
(a*) In each world w ∈ W\{w}, any atomic proposition has the same truth value
as before.
(b*) In the world w, ak is true and all other atomic propositions have the same
truth value as before.
(c*) From the world w, R∗
ak−1 accesses no world in W\{w}.
(d*) R∗
a = Ra for each atomic proposition a 6= ak−1.
I show that each p ∈ Y is true in the world w of the new interpretation (W,(R∗
p)p∈L,(vw)w∈W).
This entails that Y is consistent, a contradiction.
Case 1: p = a ∈ B+.I f a = ak then a is true in w by (b*). If a 6= ak,t h e n
v∗
w(a)=vw(a) by (b*), hence v∗
w(a)=T by (4).




Case 3: p = ak−1 → b ∈ C+.L e t w ∈ W be a world such that wR∗
ak−1w,a n d
let me show that b is true in w. By (c*), w = w. Hence I have to show that b is
true in w.I fb = ak, this holds by (b*). Now suppose b 6= ak.B ywR∗
ak−1w, we have
v∗
w(ak−1)=T. Hence vw(ak−1)=T by (b*). So wRak−1w. Hence vw(b)=T,a s
vw(ak−1 → b)=T by (4).T h u sv∗
w(b)=T by (b*).
Case 4: p = a → b ∈ C+ with a 6= ak−1.L e t w ∈ W be any world such that
wR∗
aw.I s h o w t h a t b is true in w.I f w = w and b = ak,t h e nb is true in w by
(b*). If w 6= w or b 6= ak,t h e nv∗
w(b)=vw(b) by (a*) and (b*). So I have to show
that vw(b)=T.B y (4), vw(a → b)=T.B y wR∗
aw and (d*), wRaw. Combining
vw(a → b)=T and wRaw, we obtain vw(b)=T, as desired.
Claim 6: Y = {a1,a 1 → a2,...,a k−1 → ak,¬ak},a n dt h ep a t h(a1,...,a k) is
acyclic (which completes the proof of part B).
The set {a1,a 1 → a2,...,a k−1 → ak,¬ak} is inconsistent, by an argument analog-
ous to one in part A. As by claims 3-5 the set is a subset of the (minimal inconsistent)
15set Y ,i te q u a l sY . Now assume for contradiction that (a1,...,a k) is not acyclic. Then
there exist indices 1 ≤ j<l≤ k such that aj = al.S i n c e Y is minimal incon-
sistent, its subset {a1,a 1 → a2,...,a j−1 → aj,a l → al+1,...,a k,¬ak} is consistent;
but this subset is inconsistent, again by an argument analogous to one in part A, a
contradiction, q.e.d.




mp ≥ (|Z| − 1)n +1
for every non-trivial minimal
inconsistent set Y ⊆ X.
By parts A and B above, the non-trivial minimal inconsistent sets Y ⊆ X are precisely
the sets of type (*). So F is consistent if and only if
ma1 + m¬ak +
k−1 X
j=1
maj→aj+1 ≥ kn+1for every acyclic path in X, (a1,...,a k).( 5 )
Hence the proof is completed once it is shown that:
Claim: The condition (5) holds if and only if
mb ≤ ma + ma→b − n for every connection rule a → b ∈ X.( 6 )
First assume (5) holds. To show (6), consider any a → b ∈ X.T h e n(a,b) is an
acyclic path of X. Hence, by (5), ma+m¬b+ma→b ≥ 2n+1.S o ,a sm¬b = n+1−mb,
we have ma − mb + ma→b ≥ n,h e n c emb ≤ ma + ma→b − n,a sd e s i r e d .
Now suppose (6) holds. To show (5), consider any acyclic path (a1,...,a k) in X.
Then, for each 1 ≤ j<k , aj → aj+1 ∈ X; hence, by (6), maj+1 ≤ maj +maj→aj+1−n,
or equivalently maj − maj+1 + maj→aj+1 ≥ n. Since the latter inequality holds for
each j =1 ,2,...,k− 1, we can add these k − 1 inequalities. This yields
ma1 − mak +
k−1 X
j=1
maj→aj+1 ≥ (k − 1)n.
The desired inequality follows by replacing mak by n +1− a¬ak. ¥
6 Constructing consistent quota rules
Consider a simple network X.W h i l eT h e o r e m2 allows one to check easily whether a
given quota rule F(mp)p∈X+ is consistent, let us now focus on the question of how to
construct a consistent quota rule. This may not be an obvious task: if the network X
is large, a large number of thresholds mp,p∈ X+, has to be determined by respecting
a potentially large number of inequalities. If X contains k atomic propositions, it may
c o n t a i nu pt ok(k−1) connection rules a → b,s ot h a tu pt ok(k−1) inequalities have
to be respected, where k(k − 1) grows quadratically in k.
There is a simple way to structure the problem of choosing the thresholds.
Deﬁnition 5 Let X be a simple network.
(i) The depth of X is dX := sup{k : there is a path in X of length k},i n t e r p r e t e d
as 1 if there is no path (hence no connection rule) in X.
(ii) The level of an atomic proposition a ∈ X is la := sup{k : there is a path in
X of length k ending with a}, interpreted as 1 if there is no path ending with a.
16For instance, atomic propositions a ∈ X with no parents (no a0 such that a0 →
a ∈ X) have level 1, atomic propositions whose parents have level 1 have level 2, etc.
Figure 2 shows a simple network with three levels.
b ac d e f level 1:
hi j level 2:
kl m level 3:
g
Figure 2: An acyclic simple network X of depth dX =3 .
Often, propositions of high level are act propositions, stating that a certain col-
lective act should be taken (a road should be built, a company should be downsized,
law X should be amended, ...), whereas their ancestors describe potential reasons or
arguments for act propositions (the traﬃc between two towns will increase, the de-
mand for the company’s products will fall, law X is ineﬃcient, ...). One may interpret
the level of a proposition as measuring how “fundamental” the proposition (issue) is,
on a scale from level 1 (most fundamental) to level dX (closest to collective action).
Not all simple networks can be represented in the hierarchical way of Figure 2;
for instance, if the network contains a cycle (a1,...,a k) then each of a1,...,a k has level
∞. However, each acyclic and ﬁnite simple network can be represented hierachically,
for the following reason:
Deﬁnition 6 A simple network X is acyclic if it contains no cycle, i.e. no path with
the same ﬁrst and last element.
Proposition 1 If a simple network X is acyclic and ﬁnite, its depth and set of levels
satisfy dX < ∞ and {la : a is an atomic proposition in X} = {1,2,...,d X}.
Proof.L e t X be as speciﬁed. As X is acyclic, each path in X, (a1,...,a k),
consists of pairwise distinct propositions, hence has length k ≤ |X|.S o dX ≤ |X|,
and hence dX < ∞. Now I show that M = {1,...,d X}, where M := {la : a is an
atomic proposition in X}. Obviously, M ⊆ {1,...,d X}.T os e et h a t{1,...,d X} ⊆ M,
note that by dX < ∞ there exists a path in X of length dX,s a y(a1,...,a dX);e a c h
j ∈ {1,...,d X} belongs to M because aj has level j. ¥
Combining Theorem 2 and Proposition 1, a consistent quota rule F(mp)p∈X+ for
an acyclic and ﬁnite simple network X can be constructed recursively in dX steps
(recall that a a ∈ X is a parent of b ∈ X i fa n do n l yi fa → b ∈ X):
Step l (=1 ,2,...,d X): for each atomic proposition b ∈ X of level l,c h o o s ea
threshold mb ∈ {1,...,n} and a threshold ma→b ∈ {1,...,n} for each parent a ∈ X of
b, such that
mb ≤ ma + ma→b − n for each parent a ∈ X of b.( 7 )
17This procedure is well-deﬁned because, in each step l, (i) the thresholds ma of
parents of b have already been chosen (a has lower level!) and (ii) the system (7)
always admits a solution, for instance the trivial solution given by mb =1and
ma→b = n for all parents a of b.
However, the above procedure involves the determination of a possibly very large
number of thresholds. The network of Figure 2 contains 13 atomic propositions and
11 conditionals! To reduce the number of parameters, the group might use
• t h es a m et h r e s h o l dml for all propositions in X with the same level l (∈
{1,...,d X}), where ml represents how the group treats propositions (issues) of level l,
• t h es a m et h r e s h o l dm = ma→b for each connection rule a → b ∈ X,w h e r em
represents how easily the group imposes constraints between propositions (issues).
Quota rules of this simple type are given by only dX+1 parameters (m,m1,...,m dX),
for instance in Figure 2 by 3+1=4parameters instead of 13+11 = 24 parameters.
To deﬁne a procedure for choosing these dX+1parameters, I ﬁrst need to characterise
such quota rules:
Corollary 5 Let X be an acyclic and ﬁnite simple network. A quota rule F(mp)p∈X+
with the same threshold m for each connection rule and, for each level l ∈ {1,...,d X},
the same threshold ml for all atomic propositions of level l is consistent if and only if
ml ≤ ml−1 + m − n for each level l =2 ,3,...,dX. (8)
Proof.L e tX, F(mp)p∈X+,mand ml (l =1 ,2.,,,.d X)b ea ss p e c i ﬁed. By Theorem
2, F is consistent if and only if
mb ≤ ma + ma→b − n for each connection rule a → b ∈ X.( 9 )
So I have to show that (9) is equivalent to (8).
First assume (9), and consider any level 1 <l≤ dX.B yl>1, there exists atomic
propositions a ∈ X of level l − 1 and b ∈ X of level l such that a → b ∈ X.B y(9),
mb ≤ ma + ma→b − n.H e n c eml ≤ ml−1 + m − n, as desired.
Now assume (8), and consider any a → b ∈ X.L e tl be the level of a,a n dk the
level of b.A so n ee a s i l yc h e c k s ,k>l .B y(8),w eh a v e
ml+1 ≤ ml + m − n. (10)
By k ≥ l +1and (8),w ea l s oh a v emk ≤ ml+1. By this and (10),w eh a v emk ≤
ml + m − n.H e n c emb ≤ ma + m − n, as desired. ¥
Corollary 5 yields a simple recursive procedure to construct consistent quota rules
F(mp)p∈X+ of the above type, valid again for any acyclic and ﬁnite simple network X,
with depth dX > 1 to avoid triviality.
Step 0: choose a threshold m ∈ {1,...,n} (to be used for all connection rules)
satisfying (i) m ≥ n − (n − 1)/(dX − 1).
Step l (=1 ,2,...,d X): choose a threshold ml ∈ {1,...,n} (to be used for all
propositions of level l) satisfying (ii) ml ≥ 1+( dX − l)(n − m) and (iii) ml ≤
ml−1 + m − n if l>1.
18The conditions (i)-(iii) follow from Corollary 5. Condition (iii) is obvious, and
the conditions (i) and (ii) are necessary and suﬃcient to ensure that the choices in
following steps are possible; for instance, if m violated (i) there would be no choices
of m1,...,m dX satisfying the system (8).
For example, consider the network of Figure 2 with depth dX =3 , and assume
there are n =1 0persons. Then one might make the following choices.
Step 0: m =8(note that 8 ≥ n − (n − 1)/(dX − 1) = 10 − 9/2=5 .5).
Step 1: m1 =8(note that 8 ≥ 1+( dX − 1)(n − m)=1+2× 2=5 ).
Step 2: m2 =6(note that 6 ≥ 1+( dX − 2)(n − m)=1+2=3and 6 ≤
m1 + m − n =8+8− 10 = 6).
Step 3: m3 =4(note that 4 ≥ 1+( dX − 3)(n − m)=1and 4 ≤ m2 + m − n =
6+8− 10 = 4).
7C o n c l u s i o n
A large class of judgment aggregation problems, including most classical examples,
consist in deciding many issues (whether to take an action, adopt a belief, or adopt
ad e s i r e )and deciding how these issues are interconnected (e.g. how certain beliefs
constrain certain acts). Such decision problems can be modelled using networks:
agendas X that contain atomic propositions (a,b,c,...) representing issues and con-
nection rules (a → b,a ↔ (b∧c),...) representing constraints between issues. Previous
results suggest that “democratic and rational” aggregation rules are inexistent even
for moderately interconnected networks. I showed that this impossibility is an arte-
fact of representing connection rules by material (bi)conditionals. While the material
representation of connection rules leads into impossibilities for six out of the seven
networks in Figure 1, an adequate representation of connection rules leads to a pos-
sibility result, valid for any network, however complex and interconnected it might
be. In a second theorem, I provided (for simple networks) a characterisation of the
class of all aggregation rules with the desired properties. These aggregation rules
are quota rules F(mp)p∈X+ for which the acceptance thresholds mp for propositions
p ∈ X+ satisfy simple linear inequalities. These inequalities yield a handy recursive
method to construct aggregation rules of the desired kind.
The inequalities on acceptance thresholds have a further implication. Suppose a
group, say a state’s population, has to reach (“democratic and rational”) collective
judgments on various propositions forming a (simple, acyclic and ﬁnite) network X.
The atomic propositions can be put into a hierarchical order by assigning to each
of them a level,r e ﬂecting how “fundamental” the proposition (issue) is. Proposi-
tions a ∈ X of level 1 have no parents in the network, i.e. there is no a0 ∈ X with
a0 → a ∈ X; propositions of level 2 are propositions whose parents have level 1; and
so on (see Deﬁnition 5). Level 1 propositions are most fundamental in the sense of
not receiving any reasons (arguments, justiﬁcations) by parental propositions in the
network; typical level 1 propositions are “the state should preserve its autonomy” and
“a multi-cultural society is desirable”. While level 1 propositions are not given ex-
ternal reasons, they serve as reasons for higher-level propositions, which are typically
propositions more closely linked to collective action, such as “the state should refuse
to introduce the Euro” or “immigration law X should be amended”. Now, by Corol-
19lary 3, in order to ensure “democratic and rational” decisions, low level propositions
a ∈ X have to be given higher acceptance thresholds ma than their less fundamental
descendants in the network. If “the state should preserve its autonomy” is an ancestor
of “the state should refuse to introduce the Euro”, the former might be endowed with
an acceptance threshold of 3/4 of the population, and the latter with one of 1/2 of the
population; similarly, if “a multi-cultural society is desirable” is an ancestor of “im-
migration law X should be amended”, the former needs a higher acceptance threshold
than the latter. In short, the collective must accept more fundamental propositions
less easily than less fundamental ones.
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